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Scope insensitivity is a popular anomaly in many valuation studies. Although scope insen-
sitivity is a problem that may be present in any valuation method, most previous literature
has focused on evaluating scope sensitivity within the context of contingent valuation
applications. Nevertheless, it is necessary to understand the demand-revealing properties
of experimental auctions since they are increasingly used to value products, such as quasi-
public goods. In this paper, we test explicitly whether estimates coming from experimental
auctions may pass a scope test. We conduct experimental auctions on products with a sub-
set of attributes (part) and a comprehensive set of attributes (whole) related to animal wel-
fare using two multi-product auction approaches: sequential and simultaneous. Results
show that estimates pass the scope test when multi-product auctions are conducted simul-
taneously but not when they are conducted sequentially for all valued products. Implica-
tions of these ﬁndings are discussed.
 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. IntroductionScope sensitivity refers to responsiveness to the amount of the commodity or attributes offered to respondents. Based on
the premises of economic theory, it is expected that larger amounts of a good areweakly associatedwith higher willingness to
pay (WTP) estimates, as long as preferences are rational and the valued item is a normal good. Although scope insensitivity is a
problem that may be present in any valuation method, most previous studies in the literature have focused on evaluating
scope insensitivity within the context of stated preferences, and particularly in the area of contingent valuation (CV) methods
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revealed preferences (e.g., experimental methods) are becoming widely used by practitioners in the ﬁeld.
One of these revealed preference valuation methods that is increasing in popularity is experimental auctions (Gracia,
Loureiro, & Nayga, 2011; Hoffman, Menkhaus, Dipankar, Field, &Whipple, 1993; Lusk & Schroeder, 2004; among others). Evi-
dence of this popularity is the relatively large number of papers that have been published in the last several years using
experimental auction. The bids from these auctions provide a direct measure of auction participants’ WTP for the product.
These WTP estimates can then be used for product adoption and marketing decisions as well as for beneﬁt-cost and welfare
analysis.
While previous literature has highlighted the incentive compatibility properties of revealed preference methods such as
experimental auctions, these are mostly done within the context of induced value experiments or pure private goods. Little is
known, however, about the demand-revealing properties of experimental actions when used in valuing attributes with qua-
si-public goods. Quasi-public goods are those that share characteristics between private and public goods. Speciﬁcally, for
quasi-public goods, the cost of providing the good increases less than proportionately to the number of individuals who ben-
eﬁt from it; and additionally, there are some difﬁculties in excluding those who do not pay from the beneﬁt of the good. As
Chambers, Chambers, andWhitehead (1998) suggest, the price paid for a quasi-public good does not reﬂect the total value of
the good. The nature of such goods may suggest that free-riding and other types of opportunistic behavior could be present
when valuing quasi-public goods such as organic, eco-labeled and animal welfare products. For example, animal welfare
products contain characteristics that provide utility to consumers and non-consumers. In the valuation literature, such char-
acteristics are referred to as use (quality, ﬂavor, among others) and non-use (humane treatment, fairness, right to have a
good life, etc.) values.
There is an extensive literature providing multiple reasons behind the difﬁculty of valuing public goods (e.g., see Vatn
(2004) for a synthesis). For instance, when comparing the performance of various valuation techniques when valuing public
goods with respect to private goods, Horowitz and McConnell (2002) have shown that the ratio of the difference between the
willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) estimates is highest for non-market values, followed next for or-
dinary goods and lowest for experiments involving forms of money. This ﬁnding suggests that hypothetical, cognitive and/or
strategic bias as well as risk aversion and endowment effects, and free-riding (Harrison & Hirshleifer, 1989), among others,
may be present when valuing public or quasi-public goods. Therefore, the nature of the good is an important factor in the
valuation process, as Murphy, Stevens, and Yadav (2010) suggest for the speciﬁc case of home-grown values.
Due to the lack of literature in this area and the increasing use of experimental auctions in the valuation of quasi-public
goods, it is then worthwhile to explore whether valuation estimates from experimental auctions provide consistent esti-
mates in terms of scope, according to the underlying principles of economic theory. Scope tests have been widely used as
internal validity tests in the same vein as construct validity. Construct validity or theoretical validity expects the estimates
to vary accordingly with the underlying principles of economic theory. Such principles state that the monetary value of suc-
cessive units of a good should decline; and if this effect is sufﬁciently large, WTP for a small number of units may be equal (or
approximately equal) to the WTP for a much larger number of units (Frederick & Fischhoff, 1998).
As far as we know, only one published paper has assessed whether estimates elicited via experimental auctions pass the
scope test (see Corrigan & Rousu, 2006). This paper, however, used pure private goods. Speciﬁcally, Corrigan and Rousu
(2006) investigated valuations for a second unit of an auctioned good, when participants are endowed with the ﬁrst unit.
In their study, the auctioned goods were ‘‘Plain-labeled chips’’, ‘‘American-labeled chips’’ and ‘‘Salsa’’. In all three cases, val-
uations for the second unit were higher than those for the ﬁrst unit, thereby passing a quantitative scope test. However, in
spite of these encouraging ﬁndings, no other study has evaluated the issue of scope test in experimental auctions using qua-
si-public goods.
In this work, we assess the valuation for a qualitative, rather than quantitative, improvement in the nature of a quasi-pub-
lic good. Qualitative improvements have been valued in multiple CV studies (Hanley, Schläpfer, & Spurgeon, 2003; Pate &
Loomis, 1997), choice experiments (Lusk & Schroeder, 2004; Whitehead, Haab, & Huang, 2000) and experimental auctions
(Hayes, Shogren, Shin, & Kliebenstein, 1995; Lusk, Feldkamp, & Schroeder, 2004). Of special importance are the studies by
Carlsson, Frykblom, and Lagerkvist (2007), Chilton, Burgess, and Hutchinson (2006), and Nocella, Hubbard, and Scarpa
(2010) which examine different improvements of animal welfare conditions. These previous papers dealt with the valuation
of one superior good over its traditional version, but not with the incremental valuation of two enhanced elements, when the
characteristics of the ﬁrst are also contained or embedded in the second product which contains additional characteristics,
making them qualitatively different over its regular version. The valuation of these independent and separable utility func-
tions constitutes an interesting case, as postulated by Richard (1975). These multivariate additive utility functions do not
exhibit the multivariate risk aversion property. In addition, although the attributes are objectively separable and additive,
these may not be perceived as such by respondents, thereby affecting their perceptions and the results of the scope tests.
No other study as far as we know has tested howWTP changes when differential attributes are added to a regular good in
the context of experimental auctions. In this sense, qualitative scope refers to improvements on the number of attributes of a
given good, holding the number of goods constant. The qualitative scope test conducted here is much in the same vein as
previous part-whole bias tests used in the past (Bateman, Munro, Rhodes, Starmer, & Sugden, 1997), but relying solely on
qualitative improvements. Therefore, based on this literature, the present work sheds light into the validity of welfare esti-
mates elicited via experimental auctions, and more precisely, on whether such valuations are internally consistent.
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three enhanced versions of this product. The product of interest is cured ham. The regular cured ham comes from pigs grown
following the current regulation on production and animal welfare. The three enhanced versions of the product are: (a) a
cured ham from pigs grown in improved animal house; (b) a cured ham from pigs with improved transport conditions, which
includes humane treatment during transport; and (c) a cured ham with a more comprehensive animal welfare procedure
(i.e., comprising the improvements in the other two enhanced products). We should note that the characteristics contained
in the comprehensive animal welfare product are separable and additive. Hence, this selection of products allows us to test
whether the valuation of the comprehensive good is larger than one of the parts or separate attributes. The motivation of our
research hypothesis relies then on Lancaster´s multi-attribute utility theory, by which the value of a good is based on the sum
of the value of individual characteristics. Consequently, we expect that a good that contains a full bundle of normal attributes
should be valued weakly higher than a good with only one of the single attributes. Our subjects were informed that ‘‘in order
for a cured ham product to get the comprehensive animal welfare label, both the improved animal housing condition as well
as the improved transport conditions must be met’’.
In this setting, our research hypotheses are to test (a) whether elicited bids for each of the three enhanced versions of
cured hams: cured ham with ‘‘Improved Housing,’’ ‘‘Improved Transportation’’ and ‘‘Comprehensive Animal Welfare’’ are
weakly higher than for those for the regular ham; and (b) whether marginal WTPs for the ‘‘Comprehensive Animal Welfare’’
product (whole) are weakly higher than those for either the ‘‘Improved Housing’’ (part) or the ‘‘Improved Transportation’’
product (part). To test the robustness of results, we conducted two types of multi-product auctions (sequential and simul-
taneous) which are discussed in detail later in the paper.
The structure of this paper is as follows. First, the data and experimental design are presented. These are then followed by
our research hypotheses, data analysis, empirical modeling, and results. The last section presents the main conclusions and
implications of the ﬁndings.
2. Experimental design
2.1. General design and product characteristics
The auctions were conducted in spring 2010 in the region of Aragón (Spain), in the town of Zaragoza. Zaragoza is a town
widely used by food marketers and market research consulting companies since its socio-demographics are representative of
the Spanish Census of Population. We recruited consumers, instead of students, in an attempt to ensure that people in the
experiments were generally representative of shoppers in the store in order to reduce sample selection bias (Chang, Lusk, &
Norwood, 2009). Participants were recruited in consumer associations, town hall activities and learning centers located in
different districts using a random stratiﬁed procedure by age. In addition, only people directly involved in food shopping
decisions and who consume cured ham, at least occasionally, were selected to get a representative sample of cured ham
shoppers. Due to this recruitment process, the sample of the study is made predominantly of female shoppers with a certain
degree of education and shopping experience with the good being auctioned. During the recruitment stage, participants
were not informed about the speciﬁc objective of the study.
We decided to select cured ham as the product of interest because it is one of the most frequently and highly consumed
processed meat products in many parts of Europe such as Spain where we conducted the experiments. Speciﬁcally, we used a
processed meat product instead of a fresh one, in order to isolate the experiment from the ongoing debate about the effect of
animal welfare standards on the organoleptic characteristics of the product (i.e. taste and tenderness). In particular, we auc-
tioned a 100-g package of cured ham. As mentioned previously, we have four cured ham products. The ﬁrst product is a reg-
ular cured ham that comes from pigs grown following the current regulation on production and animal welfare. The other
three products are enhanced versions of the regular product: (a) a cured ham from pigs grown in improved animal houses,
labeled as ‘‘Ham Produced with Animals grown in Improved Animal Housing,’’ (hereby referred to as ‘‘Improved Housing’’; (b) a
cured ham from pigs with Improved Transportation conditions, including humane treatment during transport, labeled as
‘‘Ham with Improved Transportation’’ (hereby referred to as ‘‘Improved Transportation’’) and; (c) a cured ham with a more
comprehensive animal welfare procedure (comprising the two improvements of the other enhanced products) labeled as
‘‘Ham Produced with Comprehensive Animal Welfare’’ (hereby referred to as ‘‘Comprehensive Animal Welfare’’). Participants
received precise information on the different cured ham packages to be auctioned (see Appendix A for exact information pro-
vided to participants with respect to each product type). This information was based on the ﬁve animal welfare freedoms
described by the EU policy on animal welfare (European Commission., 2007) and the recommendations of two experts inter-
viewed several times for this study. The animal welfare improvements were communicated to participants and displayed
through labels on the products themselves.
2.2. Research hypotheses
Our research hypotheses are related to the magnitudes of the elicited bids or marginal willingness to pay (WTP) estimates
for each of the goods over the regular product. We expect that if valuations are internally consistent, then the elicited bid
values for the cured hams with ‘‘Improved Housing’’ and ‘‘Improved Transportation’’ would be weakly higher than for the
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tation conditions (‘‘Comprehensive Animal Welfare’’) is expected to be valued weakly more than the regular ham. Thus, we
test the following null hypotheses1:1 We
valued,H01 : WTP
Housing 6 0
H02 : WTP
Transportation 6 0andH03 : WTP
Comprehensive 6 0where WTP are the elicited marginal willingness to pay obtained by subtracting the elicited bids for the regular cured ham
product from the bids for the product with the corresponding animal welfare improvement per participant.
Furthermore, and as stated earlier, it is expected that the willingness to pay for the ‘‘Comprehensive Animal Welfare’’
cured ham should be different (and in particular we expect weakly higher) than the WTP values for the ‘‘Improved Housing’’
and the ‘‘Improved Transportation’’ cured hams, respectively. Therefore, the null hypotheses are:H04 : WTP
Comprehensive 6WTPHousingandH05 : WTP
Comprehensive 6WTPTransportationwhere WTP are the elicited marginal willingness to pay.
Hypotheses H04 and H05 are tested via Wald tests. If we reject H04 and H05 we can conﬁrm that elicited marginal WTP for
the cured ham with the ‘‘Comprehensive Animal Welfare’’ is different than the WTPs for either the cured ham with ‘‘Im-
proved Housing’’ or ‘‘Improved Transportation.’’ We expect to ﬁnd weakly positive differences to pass the scope test. How-
ever, if we fail to reject these null hypotheses above (H04 and H05), we may consider that our valuations are not internally
consistent, or that they do not pass the scope test. This could happen if the valuations for the animal welfare improvements
are lower than those for the regular good (produced without any enhancement) or if the valuation for the comprehensive
animal welfare good is below than the valuation for a product with only a single animal welfare attribute.
2.3. Experimental auction design
Experimental auctions are now popularly used in preference elicitation research due to their theoretical incentive com-
patibility properties; that is, they provide an incentive to subjects to state their true preferences in contrast to hypothetical
elicitation procedures. Among the different incentive compatible auction mechanisms, we used the random nth price mech-
anism since it engages both the on and off margin bidders and because it helps ensure that consumers reveal their demand
truthfully (Shogren, Margolis, Koo, & List, 2001). The key characteristic of the random nth price auction is a random but
endogenously determined market clearing price.
In this paper, we utilized a multi-product auction (also called full-bidding) approach instead of the endowment elicitation
auction approach, because the latter requires subjects to be endowed with a regular product so that they can be asked to
indicate their WTP to exchange the regular product with an upgraded version of it. Valuations obtained from the endowment
elicitation approach have been found in previous studies to be reference-dependent (Knetsch & Wong, 2009; Rutström,
1998).
The multi-product approach requires subjects to simultaneously bid for the different goods, including the regular prod-
uct. Hence, subjects are not endowed with any product prior to bidding. The implicit or marginal valuations can then be ob-
tained by subtracting the bid given for the regular good from the bid for the upgraded versions of the good.
In order to test the robustness of our ﬁndings, we utilized two different multi-product auctions: a sequential multi-prod-
uct approach with goods valued independently, and a simultaneous multi-product approach valuing all goods juxtaposed. In
the sequential multi-product approach, participants bid for only two products: the regular product and one randomly se-
lected enhanced product (i.e., one of the three enhanced products). To obtain the bids for the four analyzed products we con-
ducted three different auctions where we auctioned the regular product plus one of the enhanced products (i.e., ‘‘Improved
Housing,’’ ‘‘Improved Transportation’’ or ‘‘Comprehensive Animal Welfare’’) in each auction. In the simultaneous multi-prod-
uct approach, subjects bid for the four analyzed products simultaneously. Hence, with our between-sample design, we con-
ducted a total of four auctions: three sequential and one simultaneous auction. Each participant only attended one of the four
different auctions conducted. Apart from this difference, the rest of the auction procedure is the same across auctions and is
explained below.
At the beginning of each session, participants were informed that the length of the session would be between 60 and
75 min and were also told that they would receive 10 € as participation fee after the experiment. After subjects consentedak inequalities may be replaced by strong inequalities if it is assumed that respondents get utility from each of the components of the goods being
as Carson (1994) suggest.
Table 1
Sample socio-demographic characteristics (%, unless stated).
Variable Deﬁnition Sequential approach Simultaneous approach
FEMALE =1 if participant is a female; 0 otherwise 82.3 56.4
AGE Average participant’s age 52.2 (17.9) 47.8 (13.3)
HSIZE Average number of people living in household 2.9 (1.3) 2.9 (1.1)
HIGH_SCHOOL =1 if participant had high school studies; 0 otherwise 29.1 25.9
LOW_INCOME =1 if net monthly income is less than 2500€; 0 otherwise 64.6 45.16
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis.
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product information. Subjects were ﬁrst asked to complete a questionnaire requesting information on socioeconomic and
demographic characteristics. Before the actual auctions of cured ham products, subjects were explicitly informed about
the auction procedures emphasizing that their dominant strategy is to reveal their true values. To avoid demand reduction
effects, participants were informed that one round and one product will be randomly drawn as binding. Hence, they could
only buy one of the products at the end of the auction. In addition to the detailed instructions about the auction procedure, a
chocolate bar practice auction was used to further familiarize participants with the experimental auction procedure.
After the practice auction with the chocolate bars, we conducted the cured ham auction. First, the monitor passed the
packages of cured ham to be auctioned around so that each participant could inspect the products. The auction was then
conducted in several steps (only step 1 is different between the sequential and simultaneous multi-product approach):
Step 1: Subjects simultaneously submitted a bid for the regular product and for one of the enhanced animal welfare prod-
uct (sequential approach2), or a bid for each of the four different products simultaneously (simultaneous approach).
Step 2: The bids were collected and ranked from highest to lowest. Then, a number ‘‘n’’ between 2 and the number of par-
ticipants in the session was randomly picked. For each cured ham auction, this number, the n  1 highest bidders and the
nth price were posted on the board.
Step 3: Four additional rounds were conducted.
Step 4: After all the rounds were conducted, a random draw determined which of the ﬁve rounds was binding.
Step 5: A random draw also determined which one of the two (four) cured ham products was binding in the sequential
(simultaneous) auctions.
Step 6: Once the binding round and the binding product were determined, the top n  1 bidders in the binding round pur-
chased the binding cured ham package and paid a price equivalent to the nth highest bid for the product.
We should note that the use of multiple rounds with price feedback (posted prices) was ﬁrst applied in experimental auc-
tions because as Plott (1996) suggested, people’s preferences are learned through experience and market exposure. Hence,
price feedback in multiple rounds was used as a mechanism for subjects to learn the auction market. However, some
researchers have cautioned that repeated exposure of subjects to market price might cause their bids to become afﬁliated,
which could cause the incentive compatibility property of the auction mechanism to break down (Corrigan & Rousu, 2006;
Harrison, 2006) and were in favor of one-shot institutions, particularly if bids show afﬁliation (Harrison, Harstad, & Rut-
ström, 2004). On the other hand, there is another group of researchers who is supportive of the use of multiple rounds, argu-
ing that this procedure yields valuations more consistent results due to the learning effect (Corrigan, Drichoutis, Lusk, Nayga,
& Rousu, 2011; Cox & Grether, 1996; Shogren, 2006; Shogren et al., 2001). Given that this issue is still unsettled in the lit-
erature, we opted to use multiple rounds with price feedback based on the premise that it could enhance the learning effect.
Have shown that in the context of animal welfare, repetition and learning help preferences to converge towards rational
standard expectations.
3. Results
Ninety six3 participants took part in the sequential multi-product auctions and 62 in the simultaneous multi-product auc-
tions. Multiple sessions in each auction were conducted with each session containing between 14 and 20 randomly assigned
participants. The socio-demographic proﬁle of our participants is displayed in Table 1. In both treatments (i.e., both types of
auctions), most participants are female, with an average age of 52 and 48 years, respectively, and around 30% have high school
studies and live in households with 2.9 members.
Elicited WTPs per round in each of the auction approaches are presented in Tables 2 and 3. As can be observed, WTP val-
ues increased from round 1 to round 2 but generally stabilized after round 2. Consequently, there seems to be no evidence of
the bids being correlated or ‘‘afﬁliated’’ with the posted price.2 We had three different independent auctions, one for the ‘‘Improved Housing’’; another for the ‘‘Improved Transportation’’ and one more for the
‘‘Comprehensive Animal Welfare.’’
3 In particular, 31 participated in the ‘‘Improved Housing’’ auction; 28 in the ‘‘Improved Transportation’’ and 37 in the ‘‘Comprehensive Animal Welfare’’.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics of WTP for the cured ham with animal welfare labels by round in the sequential multi-product auction (€ per package).
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Mean
Comprehensive animal welfare 37 obs
Mean 0.323 0.352 0.339 0.319 0.308 0.330
Standard deviation 0.271 0.265 0.272 0.236 0.229 0.218
Median 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.3
Improved Housing 31 obs
Mean 0.323 0.354 0.333 0.340 0.312 0.333
Standard deviation 0.403 0.399 0.304 0.305 0.283 0.326
Median 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
Improved Transportation 28 obs
Mean 0.466 0.488 0.462 0.423 0.427 0.453
Standard deviation 0.450 0.450 0.330 0.305 0.33 0.346
Median 0.25 0.35 0.4 0.37 0.35 0.345
H01 : WTP
Housing 6 0
t-Test 4.46 4.95 6.09 6.13 6.14 5.69
p-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
H02 : WTP
Transportation 6 0
t-Test 5.48 5.77 7.42 7.33 6.89 6.91
p-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
H03 : WTP
Comprehensive 6 0
t-Test 7.75 8.09 7.60 8.21 8.20 9.20
p-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
H04 : WTP
Comprehensive WTPHousing ¼ 0
v2 0.11 0.03 0.08 0.31 0.04 0.03
p-Value 0.91 0.97 0.93 0.75 0.96 0.97
H05 : WTP
Comprehensive WTPTransportation ¼ 0
v2 1.48 1.52 1.65 1.54 1.71 1.74
p-Value 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.09
Table 3
Descriptive statistics of WTP for the cured ham with animal welfare labels by round in the simultaneous multi-product auction (€ per package).
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Mean
Comprehensive animal welfare 62 obs
Mean 0.498 0.544 0.522 0.546 0.540 0.530
Standard deviation 0.376 0.411 0.350 0.362 0.338 0.343
Median 0.350 0.450 0.450 0.500 0.500 0.435
Improved housing 62 obs
Mean 0.198 0.202 0.191 0.193 0.193 0.195
Standard deviation 0.226 0.240 0.212 0.216 0.450 0.204
Median 0.150 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.135
Improved transportation 62 obs
Mean 0.332 0.351 0.327 0.348 0.337 0.339
Standard deviation 0.290 0.319 0.262 0.309 0.277 0.266
Median 0.225 0.300 0.250 0.300 0.300 0.435
H01 : WTP
Housing 6 0
t-Test 6.88 6.61 7.10 7.04 6.91 7.55
p-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
H02 : WTP
Transportation 6 0
t-Test 8.99 8.67 9.83 8.87 9.60 10.01
p-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
H03 : WTP
Comprehensive 6 0
t-Test 10.44 10.43 11.74 11.87 12.57 12.16
p-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
H04 : WTP
Comprehensive WTPHousing ¼ 0
v2 9.86 9.01 10.67 9.97 10.76 11.11
p-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
H05 : WTP
Comprehensive WTPTransportation ¼ 0
v2 7.29 8.75 7.21 9.97 8.76 10.26
p-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 4
Tobit model with random effects for the auctions: marginal WTPs estimations.
Sequential multi-product auction Simultaneous multi-product auction
Parameters Z Parameters Z
Round 2 0.0260 1.20 0.0247 1.77*
Round 3 0.0071 0.32 0.0056 0.40
Round 4 0.0088 0.41 0.0226 1.62
Round 5 0.0225 1.03 0.0164 1.18
HOUSING 0.3567 2.05** 0.1387 1.2
TRANSPORTATION 0.3872 2.09** 0.3050 2.63**
COMPREHENSIVE 0.3169 1.85* 0.4970 4.28**
FEMALE 0.0043 0.05 0.0604 1.38
AGE 0.0038 1.89* 0.0035 2.12**
HSIZE 0.0412 1.61 0.0335 1.57
HIGH_SCHOOL 0.1161 1.66* 0.0713 1.53
LOW_INCOME 0.0852 1.41 0.1454 3.13**
Number of observations 480 930
Log Likelihood 139.99 221.28
v2 173.85** 375.42
p-Value 0.00 0.00
ðH04 : WTPComprehensive WTPHousingÞ ¼ 0
v2 0.29 53.06
p-Value 0.59 0.00
H05 : ðWTPComprehensive WTPTransportationÞ ¼ 0
v2 0.79 15.38
p-Value 0.37 0.00
Statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients at 0.001 statistical level.
* Statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients at 0.1 statistical level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients at 0.01 statistical level.
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tial or simultaneous. Second, as Tables 2 and 3 show, all the marginal WTPs for both the sequential and simultaneous multi-
product approachesarepositive and statisticallydifferent fromzerobasedon theone-tailed t-test (H01,H02 andH03) indicating
that hypothesis 1, 2 and 3 are rejected. The results indicate that the bids elicited for the cured hamwith ‘‘Improved Housing’’,
with ‘‘Improved Transportation’’ andwith both improvements (‘‘Comprehensive AnimalWelfare’’) are higher than for the reg-
ular cured ham, suggesting that consumers positively value each of the three animal welfare products more than the standard
product (i.e., regular cured ham). This ﬁnding is in agreementwith previous empirical papers conducted to assess different ani-
mal welfare improvements in different countries (e.g., Carlsson et al., 2007; Chilton et al., 2006; Nocella et al., 2010).
Our third result is that we failed to reject hypothesis 4 and hypothesis 5 (H04 and H05) at the 5% signiﬁcance level in the
sequential multi-product approach but these two hypotheses were rejected in the simultaneous approach as suggested by
the t-tests and the corresponding p-values reported in Tables 2 and 3. This result indicates that in the sequential multi-prod-
uct approach marginal WTP for the three enhanced cured hams are not statistically different from each other. However, in
the simultaneous approach, the results suggest that the cured ham with ‘‘Comprehensive Animal Welfare’’ (whole) is valued
more than either the ‘‘Improved Housing’’ or ‘‘Improved Transportation’’ product.
Thus, the ﬁndings above suggest that the valuations are sensitive to the type of multi-product auction applied, showing
that for sequential multi-product auctions, the results imply that these valuations do not pass the scope test since we failed
to reject hypotheses 4 and 5. On the other hand, when conducting a simultaneous multi-product auction, our results provide
evidence in favor of the passing of the scope test because the ﬁve hypotheses were rejected.
In order to assess whether these differences in valuation are mainly due to the different auction treatments, we model
these marginal valuations as a function of various control variables, including socio-demographic variables, rounds of bid-
dings, and the different animal welfare labeled products using a random effects tobit model, which controls for the trunca-
tion at zero of the dependent variable. In this particular case, the number of zero observations is fairly small, representing
4.40% and 5.62% of the total observations in the simultaneous and in the sequential auctions, respectively.4 The estimated
tobit model incorporating random effects is as follows:4 Thi
selectioWTPit ¼ maxð0;aþ b0xit þ ui þ eitÞ ð1Þwhere WTPit is the marginal WTP for the ith subject in the tth bidding round; xij is a vector of independent variables which
includes dummy indicators identifying the different animal welfare labels (HOUSING, TRANSPORTATION and COMPREHEN-
SIVE), the socio-demographic characteristics deﬁned in Table 1 as well as the bidding rounds. Moreover, ui is the individual
speciﬁc disturbance for the ith subject constant through time and eit is the overall error term.s small number of zeros has precluded us from ﬁtting our data with a double hurdle (as in Botelho, Harrison, Pinto Costa, & Rutström, 2009) or a
n type probit model.
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cantly different from each other, we estimated Eq. (1) separately for the two auction approaches. The results are presented
in Table 4.
First, estimates in Table 4 show that round dummy variables were not statistically signiﬁcant in both models indicating
that the bids are not correlated or ‘‘afﬁliated’’ with the posted price. Second, the estimated parameters for the dummy vari-
ables for the three animal welfare labels (HOUSING, TRANSPORTATION and COMPREHENSIVE) are statistically different from
zero, except for the HOUSING indicator in the simultaneous model, indicating that hypothesis 1, 2 and 3 are rejected. This
result is in agreement with previous results in Tables 2 and 3 which suggests that bids for the cured ham with one of the
three animal welfare improvements are higher than the ones for the regular cured ham. To test hypotheses 4 and 5, we con-
ducted a chi-square test of equality between the HOUSING and COMPREHENSIVE coefﬁcients and between TRANSPORTA-
TION and COMPREHENSIVE coefﬁcients shown at the bottom of Table 4. The null hypotheses of equality between the
estimated parameters are not rejected in the sequential multi-product model but they are rejected in the simultaneous mul-
ti-product model. These results indicate that in the sequential multi-product approach, valuations are not sensitive to the
scope of the good, while in the simultaneous multi-product approach, the valuations pass the scope test. In other words,
in the simultaneous multi-product approach, higher valuations have been found for the ‘‘Comprehensive Animal Welfare’’
product (whole) than for both the ‘‘Improved Housing’’ (part) and ‘‘Improve Transportation’’ (part). In both auction ap-
proaches, the valuations for each animal welfare cured ham product are marginally higher than the valuations for the regular
ham valuation.
Moreover, we found that some of the socio-demographic characteristics affect the marginal WTPs. Speciﬁcally, AGE pos-
itively inﬂuences WTPs, while HIGH_SCHOOL negatively inﬂuences WTPs in the sequential multi-product auction and
LOW_INCOME negatively inﬂuences WTPs in the simultaneous auction. The rest of the socio-demographic variables are
not statistically signiﬁcant.
So why are the results different in the two types of multi-product approaches used? There are several possible reasons
why our WTP values do not pass the scope test for the sequential multiproduct auction, while they do in the simultaneous
multi-product auction. The ﬁrst line of reason that may help us understand the results is related to the ‘‘evaluability’’ of the
different attributes, or whether it is easier to value the attributes jointly or separately (Bazerman, Moore, Tenbrunsel, Wade-
Benzoni, & Blount, 1999; Hsee, 1998; Kahneman & Knetsch, 1992). This implies that attributes that are easier to evaluate,
and not necessarily the most important are used when an individual values a good in isolation (List, 2002). Therefore, biased
valuations may suffer from ‘‘anchoring’’ or emotional effects related to the presence of a given attribute. Based on this line of
research, we believe that in the case of multi-product valuation, simultaneous bidding procedures should be recommended
to practitioners, so that biases in bidding are minimized, even if these could be complicated to implement when the number
of products is large. Due to the close resemblance of this bidding scenario with a market setting, we believe that this type of
auction mechanism is quite appropriate to reveal incentive valuations.
An additional concern is the moral dimension of the goods that interferes in the additivity of the elicited values. The goods
may have been deemed by our subjects as quite similar in the sequential auctions of animal welfare improved products, due
to the absence of information about the entire animal welfare production chain. Consequently, valuations may have been
affected by a similar moral concern, which was independent of the amount of welfare improvement provided in each prod-
uct. Bennett and Blaney (2002) investigated the issue of social morals in a CV exercise of production based on animal welfare
standards and showed that greater social consensus increases elicited values. Moral dimension could also be related to the
emotions caused by the valuation scenario. These emotions may then also be correlated with valuation anomalies. Biel,
Johansson-Stenman, and Nilsson (2006) have shown that emotions play a signiﬁcant role when understanding the disparity
between welfare estimates when valuing public goods.
Other potential sources of differences are related to the between-sample sequential design. In this regard, previous liter-
ature, including Frederick and Fischhoff (1998), among others, have shown much greater sensibility of estimates in within-
subjects experiments, where participants value different goods differing in their scale. However, as recognized by Ariely, Loe-
wenstein, and Prelec (2003), it is possible that participants in within-subjects tests may only give the impression of provid-
ing rational responses, when in fact, their valuations are totally arbitrary.5
Another potential effect is related to the particular nature of quasi-public goods, which includes a potential free-riding
effect in the sequential auction by subjects that feel that they would prefer the establishment of more restrictive animal-wel-
fare practices, but would rather not pay for such improvements themselves. This effect can be magniﬁed in the presence of
biases about the dimensionality of the good in question. All these possible explanations for the WTP values not passing the
scope test should be further tested in future studies.
4. Conclusions and Implications
Many currently available techniques for eliciting WTP values for goods suffer from hypothetical biases. Consequently,
many economists are now using experimental auctions given that they involve actual exchange of real money and products
in an active market. Given the increasing use of experimental auctions in valuation research, particularly for quasi-public5 We thank a reviewer for reminding us about this potential issue.
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WTP values from experimental auctions are now being used not only for marketing and product adoption decisions but also
for welfare analysis and policy making.
Our objective in this study is to investigate the existence of possible anomalies when employing experimental auctions
with quasi-public goods. Scope insensitivity has been an issue intensively dealt with in other valuation techniques, such as
CV, but not in experimental auctions. No other study has evaluated the scope sensitivity of value estimates from auctions for
quasi-public goods. In our study, we investigated the sensitivity of elicited WTP estimates with respect to three animal wel-
fare improvements and assessed the validity of such estimates using two auction approaches: sequential and simultaneous
multi-product auctions. Speciﬁcally, we tested whether people are willing to pay signiﬁcantly higher amounts of money for
more comprehensive animal welfare schemes than for less comprehensive ones.
Our results generally suggest that mean WTPs of the ‘‘Improved Housing,’’ ‘‘Improved Transportation’’ and ‘‘Comprehen-
sive Animal Welfare’’ products in both auction approaches are positive and statistically signiﬁcant. However, when testing
differences between auction approaches, the mean WTPs from the sequential multi-product auction show no statistically
signiﬁcant differences between the ‘‘Comprehensive Animal Welfare’’ product (whole) and any of the ‘‘Improved Housing’’
(part) and ‘‘Improve Transportation’’ product (part). Thus, valuations show no sensitivity to scope of the good. The obtained
results change drastically however when the auction mechanism allows for simultaneous bidding for all products (simulta-
neous multi-product auction). In this case, elicited WTPs for the ‘‘Comprehensive Animal Welfare’’ are higher than those of
any of the other animal welfare improved goods. In addition, the random effects tobit results for the simultaneous multi-
product auction is consistent with this ﬁnding, while the sequential approach random effects tobit results also suggest that
WTPs for the ‘‘Comprehensive Animal Welfare’’ product is not signiﬁcantly different from either the WTPs for the ‘‘Improved
Housing’’ or the ‘‘Improved Transportation’’ product, ceteris paribus.
The obtained ﬁndings are both of theoretical and practical importance. Theoretically, as earlier suggested by Hsee (1998),
Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, and Bazerman (1999), Bazerman et al. (1999) and others, they corroborate the mounting evi-
dence that preferences may not always be stable in actual choice decision making. Furthermore, they could be reference
dependent, depending signiﬁcantly on the information provided, level of experience with respect to the transactions made,
and potential ethical conﬂicts. However, all things considered, it seems difﬁcult to prevent these possible preference anom-
alies from happening. List (2002) documented the phenomenon of preference reversal in an actual market, and even with
very experienced consumers. The current paper documents the phenomena of scope insensitivity in lab experiments. This
issue has so far been generally ignored in the literature.
All these issues should be further investigated in the future, in order to provide recommendations on how to deal with
preference anomalies, when detected. Previous research suggested several venues to deal with anomalies, including benign
paternalism (Choi, Laibson, & Metrick, 2003) or mechanism design to force consistency (Norwood & Lusk, 2011). However, all
these ‘‘forcing’’ mechanisms may also provide questionable estimates due to the fact that their outcomes may not exactly
reﬂect neither consumer´s preferences, nor the opportunity criterion (Sudgen, 2004), nor market behavior. Our current re-
sults should encourage practitioners to further assess the demand revealing properties of auctions and valuation techniques.
Additional reliability tests related to internal versus external scope tests should also be conducted.Table A.1
Information presented to the participants (Translated from Spanish).
REGULAR CURED HAM: Pigs are grown following the current regulation on production and animal welfare
 The amount of animals per m2 is the highest as possible*, and overcrowding is rather common.
 The pigs are reared in pens that are closed until they are sent to the slaughter house.
 The farms can be fully mechanized, so that the animals do not have any direct contact with the stockmen.
 Transport time should not be longer than 8 hours, avoiding the hottest hours of the day
 Animals can be transported several times, between farms or from the farm to the slaughter house, along their life.
Cured ham with ‘‘Improved Housing’’: Pigs are grown in improved animal house
 The number of pigs reared in a pen is lower than in the current production system.
 The pigs are reared in pens that can be opened, so they have the possibility to stay inside and outside the pen and walk and see each other.
Cured ham with ‘‘Improved Transportation’’: Pigs have improved transportation
 To have less stress during transport, pigs should have seen the stockman in the farm to get used to people before they see the driver/attendant for
transport
 Transport time should not be longer than 6 hours, avoiding the hottest hours of the day
 The number of transports should be the least as possible along the animal life
Cured ham with ‘‘Comprehensive Animal Welfare’’: Pigs are grown in improved animal houses and have improved transportation
 The number of pigs reared in a pen is lower than in the current production system.
 The pigs are reared in pens that can be opened, so they have the possibility to stay inside and outside the pen and walk and see each other.
 To have less stress during transport, pigs should have seen the stockman in the farm to get used to people before they see the driver/attendant for
transport
 Transport time should not be longer than 6 hours, avoiding the hottest hours of the day
 The number of transports should be the least as possible along the animal life
* According to the Council Directive of 19 November 1991 laying down minimum standards for the protection of pigs.
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